JUDICIAL REVIEW AND CHURCH COURTS IN THE LAW OF SCOTLAND by Cranmer, Frank
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND CHURCH COURTS IN
THE LAW OF SCOTLAND
Frank Cranmer·
INTRODUCTION
Until now, it has been a long-settled principle of Scots law that there is one
Church recognised by law - the Church of Scotland - with proper courts in the
full legal sense of that tenn, and a series of private ecclesiastical organisations
with tribunals of no particular legal standing. 1 Therefore:
"The courts of the Church of Scotland are legally established courts
of the realm whereas courts of other Churches have jurisdiction only
so far as conferred by their own constitutions and the adherence of
their members. No claim for damages lies in the Court of Session
against a Church court for a judgment in a proper case of discipline
duly brought before it. The civil courts are bound to assist the
Church courts in making their decrees effectual, but cannot review
their decisions in matters falling within their jurisdiction."2
Similarly, because they are a fully-recognised branch of the system of courts,
they share the powers and privileges of the civil courts. The General Assembly as
the Supreme Court shares with the Inner House of the Court of Session the
power to reduce its own decrees and, like tlle Court of Session and the High
• I would like to express my thanks to Francis Coleman for reading this article in draft and
giving me the benefit of his views. The conclusions, however, are my own.
1 For the history of Establishment in Scotland, see C.R.Munro, "Does Scotland have an
Established Church?" (1997) 4 Journal of Ecclesiastical Law 639.
2 D.M.walker, The Scottish Legal System ( (Jh ed., ] 992, w.Green) at 311-2. See also
Munro, ibid at 645.
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Court of Justiciary, exercises the nobile officium.3
The proceedings of the courts of the Kirk also enjoy considerable protection
from actions for defamation.
"When the General Assembly exercises judicial functions in relation
to matters properly brought before that court, persons engaged in
the proceedings are probably protected by absolute privilege ... It is
settled law that no court of the Church of Scotland may be sued in
respect of any judgment or sentence pronounced in any cause duly
brought before it, regularly conducted and within its jurisdiction."4
It should be noted, however, that this immunity extends only to the courts of
the Kirk when they are acting in a judicial capacity. Andrew Herron suggests
that, since much of their business is non-judicial, before any statement is made to
which exception might be taken, the members of any Church court would be wise
to consider carefully whether such a statement might be factually inaccurate or
construed as malicious.s
All this is well-tmderstood. However, there has been one area in which the
position of Church courts of all denominations was not entirely clear: that of
judicial review.
THE EARLIER CASES
The readiness of the Court of Session to distinguish between the actings of the
courts of the Kirk and the decisions of the tribunals of nonconformist Churches
was already becoming apparent from a series of decided cases which predate the
Church of Scotland Act 1921.
In Lockhart v. Presbytery of Deer, Lord President Boyle stated that the courts
of the Kirk possessed exclusive jurisdiction in ecclesiastical causes and that the
Court of Session would not normally interfere with their decisions:
3 An equitable power to supply a remedy where the existing law is silent; it is not,
however, a power to set aside the existing law. See A.Herron, The Law and Practice of the Kirk
(1995, Chapter House, Edinburgh) at 276; Walker, op cit, at 193.
4 C.K.Davidson, "Church of Scotland" 3 Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia para. 154 7, citing
Sturrock v. Grieg (1849) lID. 1220 & Wight v. Presbytery of Dunkeld (1870) 8 M. 921.
SHerron, supra.n.3 at 277.
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"We have as little right to interfere with the procedure of the Church
courts in matters of ecclesiastical discipline as we have to interfere
with the proceedings of the Court of Justiciary in a criminal
question. "6
In Wight v. Presbytery of Dunkeld the Court of Session agreed that the
proceedings in the Presbytery of which the pursuer complained were irregular,
contrary to the laws and practice of the Church, and altogether nul!.7
Nevertheless, Lord Justice Clerk Moncrieff refused to set them aside:
"If ... this were a case in which we were called upon to review the
proceedings of an inferior court, I should have thought a strong case
had been made for our interference. But whatever inconsiderate
dicta to that effect may have been thrown out, that is not the law of
Scotland. The jurisdiction of the Church courts, as recognised
judicatories of this realm, rests on a similar statutory foundation to
that under which we administer justice within these walls ...Within
their spiritual province the Church courts are as supreme as we are
within the civil; and as this is a matter relating to the discipline of
the Church, and solely within the cognisance of the Church courts, I
think we have no power whatever to interfere."g
On the other hand, the attitude of the Court of Session to the tribunals of
nonconformist Churches has been much more equivocal. Even though such
tribunals are unofficial, in Auchinloss v. Black, Lord Justice Clerk Braxfield
nevertheless refused in a case involving the Secession Church "to review the
proceedings of the Associate Congregation, commonly called Burghers, when
sentences are pronounced by them in their ecclesiastical character.'>9
Not long afterwards, however, in Drummond v. Farquar the designation of the
pursuer, Drummond, as "one of the bishops or senior clergymen of the superior
order of the Episcopal communion in Scotland" was struck out as "not
6 (1851) 13 D. 1296 at 1299.
7 Supra.n.4 at 925 per Lord Cowan.
8 Ibid.
9 Hume, Decisions, 6111 March, 1793.
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recognised by the court",10while in Dunbar v. Skinner'] Lord President Boyle
ruled that "there exists in Scotland no Episcopal Church whatever except as a
distinct sect, fully recognised and protected under the Toleration ACt.,,12
In Mathers v. Laurie it was held that a Free Church Kirk Session Minute could
not be adduced as conclusive evidence of itself, since the tribunal concerned was
not a court of law; parole evidence had to be led to prove the Minute. 13
Notwithstanding this distinction, however, the Court of Session has in practice
been reluctant to interfere with the decisions of nonconfonnist tribunals,
seemingly on the grounds that such a tribunal is the duly-constituted regulatory
and disciplinary body of a voluntary association and that the members, by virtue
of their membership, enter into a contractual obligation to submit to its
decisions.]4 There is therefore a line of decided cases which suggest that the
Court of Session will normally intervene only when a civil, rather than an
ecclesiastical, wrong has been committed.
In Forbes v. Eden, the Rector of Burntisland brought an act against the Primus
and others of the General Synod of the Episcopal Church, averring that, in
adopting a code of canon law in 1862 which inter alia substituted the English
Communion Rite of 1662 for the Scots Rite of 1764, Synod had acted ultra
vires.ls The pursuer concluded for reduction, i.e. annulment, of the new canons;
however, the pursuer's pleas were dismissed by the Lord Ordinary.
On reclaimer, i.e. appeal to the Inner House, the pursuer's arguments were
again rejected by the Inner House on the grounds of irrelevance. Lord Cowan
went further in his obiter:
"I cannot but regard it as an entire novelty to ask courts of law to
determine whether the ruling judicatory of a voluntary Church acted
within its powers in matters so purely and exclusively relating to the
10 Faculty Collection, 6th.July, 1809 - see F.Lyall, Of presbyters and kings (1980,
Aberdeen University Press) at 88.
11 (1849) 11 D. 945.
12 i.e the Scottish Episcopalians Act 1711.
13 (1849) 12 D. 433.
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government of the body as a Church, its doctrines and discipline ...
When the ecclesiastical governing body has recognised changes
either in doctrinal matters, or in the rights [sic] and ceremonies of
the church, dissentient laymen may leave its communion. Their
remedy cannot be to bring the resolutions of the church judicatory
into a court oflaw, as a court of review. Some civil wrong justifying
a demand for redress, or some patrimonial injury entitling the party
to claim damages, must be alleged and instructed, ere the civil court
entertain and adjudicate in such cases. This is the principle which
pervades the whole of the cases of this class. "16
Equally, in Skerret v. Oliver, the First Division refused to reinstate a licentiate
of the United Presbyterian Church who had been suspended and deprived by the
D.P. Synod "for having, under certain circmnstances, met and walked with a
young lady" on the grounds tllat "courts of law take no concern with the
resolutions of voluntary associations except so far as they affect civil rights."l?
An even narrower view was taken in McDonald v. Bums.18 Five extern Sisters
of the Colettine Community of Poor Clares in Edinburgh had been dismissed
from their convent by the Sacred Congregation of Religious in Rome, but refused
to leave. The trustees of the Convent brought an action in the Court of Session
for their removal from the convent. The defenders argued that they had been
dismissed in contravention of the statute of their Order regarding the dismissal of
extern Sisters, in that no specific charges had been made against them and that
they had been given no opportunity to respond. The Lord Ordinary (Robertson]
having found for the pursuers, the defenders reclaimed.
In granting an interlocutor, Lord Justice Clerk Aitchison made the following
general statement of the rights of ecclesiastical bodies to regulate their own
affairs without judicial interference:
" ...theJimits ...are strictly defined, and should not be incautiously
extended. Where civil rights are concerned, appeal may be made to
the courts of law for their protection, or for some form of redress,
but the mere fact that a civil right is qIJected by itselfforms no
16 Ibid. at 163 [emphasis added].
17 (1896) 3 S.L.T. 257 per Lord Robinson. It was a different world in those days.
18 1940 S.C.376.
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just!{lcation for interference. for civil consequences may often
resultfrom decisions q{ ecclesiastical courts in matters that lie
properly within their own jurisdiction. "19
There the matter might have rested; but the difference between the attitude of the
Court of Session towards the courts of the Established Church and the tribunals
of other religious bodies in Scotland has been highlighted most clearly by three
recent cases: one involving the Free Presbyterian Church and the others involving
the Kirk. In particular, the uncertainty over the degree to which the tribunals of
dissenting Churches are obliged to abide by the rules of natural justice appears
finally to have been resolved.20
BRENTALL v. FREE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF SCOTLAND21
In Brentall the facts were as follows.22 The Reverend John Brentall, together
with the Reverend Moshe Radcliff, presented an Overture to his Presbytery
raising the question of whether a Protest against a decision of the Synod of the
Church might be necessary so that a person might exonerate his conscience. The
Overture was rejected by Presbytery, and they took the matter to Synod - the
Supreme Court of their Church.
At the Synod of May, 1980 the Overture was dismissed without discussion:
Mr.Brentall and Mr.Radcliffthen entered a Protest against the refusal of the
Synod "of a scriptural discussion anent Protest," but stating that:
"we hereby declare that by tllis Protest we do in no way separate
ourselves from the Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland or resign
our respective charges or act contrary to our ordination vows or
impugn the authority of this Venerable Court or call the integrity of
this Venerable Court into question."
19 Ibid. at 381 [emphasis added].
20 For a discussion of the uncertainties, see G.W.Patterson, "The law of Scotland and the
decisions of the ecclesiastical courts" (1986) Juridical Review 152.
21 1986 S.L.T. 470.
22 For the narrative background to the case, see J .Macleod, No great mischief if you fall:
the Highland experience (1993, Mainstream Publishing, Edinburgh).
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It should be remembered that "Protest" is a tenn of art in Presbyterian church
law. It was by Protest that Thomas Chalmers, David Welsh and their colleagues
initiated the Disruption in 1843, when they walked out of the General Assembly
of the Kirk and founded the Free Church of Scotland. Moreover, it was by
Protest against what tlley saw as tile heretical stance of the Free Church
Declaratory Act of 1892 towards liberty of opinion in the construction of the
Westminster Confession, that Donald Macfarlane, Donald Macdonald and tI1eir
colleagues separated themselves from the Free Church in 1893, and founded the
Free Presbyterian Church.23 The precise effect of a Protest is therefore of
enormous importance to the Free Presbyterian Church; the official view is that
unless Macfarlane's Protest in 1893 had immediately separated him and his
colleagues from the Free Church of the Declaratory Act, then the historical link
with the "pure" pre-Declaratory Act Free Church would have been broken at that
point, and the claim of the Free Presbyterian Church to be the one, true Reformed
Church of Scotland would thereby be invalidated.24
Moreover, the Protest Question has been a matter of some controversy
t1rroughout the history of the Free Presbyterian Church. In 1944 Roderick
Mackenzie expressed his disagreement with the Synod view of Protest and was
thereby held to have separated himself from the Church - with the result that he
founded the Free Presbyterian Relief Congregation.2s It was in 1944, therefore
that the Free Presbyterian Church Synod published a statement on the nature of
Protest which included the assertions that:
"A Protest in itself does not necessarily put the protester out of the
Church; yet, a Protest tabled and persisted in against the decision of
the Supreme Court carmot be received; [but] ... a Protest may and
usually does involve the se(f-exclusion qf the person protesting
from the Supreme Court of tile Church."
At the 1980 Synod on the occasion in question, the Clerk first asked Messrs
23 It was by Protest and Deed of Separation that those who left the Free Presbyterian
Church in 1989 in order to fonn the Associated Presbyterian Churches separated themselves from
the F.P.C..
24 Macleod, supra.n.22 at !O3.
25 See A. Morrison, "Protest Question," in N.M.de S.Cameron (ed.) Dictionary of
Scottish Church History and Theology (1993, T.& T. Clerk, Edinburgh).
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Brentall and Radcliff if they would change their Protest to a Dissent (which may
be tendered simply to relieve the dissenter from any involvement in the decision
of the COurt.)26When they refused to do so, the Clerk pointed out that, in
accordance with the 1944 statement, a Protest against a decision of the Supreme
Court could not be received. After deliberation, at part of which the complainers
were not present, Synod then determined to discipline them and, it being clear
that they had not changed their position, they were suspended sine die.
Mr.Brentall raised an action for the reduction of the resolutions to suspend him,
with ancillary conclusions for interdict and reparation.27 There was no dispute
between the parties as to the competence of the Court of Session to reduce as
unlawful decisions of the Synod of the Free Presbyterian Church; however, the
defenders argued that Synod had found Messrs Brentall and Radcliff guilty of
contumacy and had therefore acted within its powers.28 The Lord Ordinary
[Dlmpark] dismissed the action.
The pursuer reclaimed, arguing that, in acting as it did, Synod had exceeded its
own powers and had failed to observe the rules of natural justice. The Second
Division held that the avennents instructing a charge of contumacy were
irrelevant and that, accordingly, the decision of the Synod to suspend the pursuer
was null and void, on the grounds that it was contrary to natural justice. A decree
of reduction was consequently granted.
The details of the charge of contumacy need not concern us, and the court
declined to get involved in the theology of Protest - though Lord Robertson did
quote with approval the obiter of Lord Guthrie inMackay v. Macleod to the
effect that the making of a Protest by a minister of the Church against a decision
of Synod could not be construed as implying his separation from the Church, but
merely his disapproval of the decision against which the Protest was made.29
What is of greater interest for the purposes of the present discussion, however, is
the willingness of the court to examine the extent to which the Synod had
complied with the rules of natural justice. Lord Justice Clerk Ross outlined the
basic principles as follows:
26 Ibid.
27 Mr. Radcliff raised a separate action; it was agreed that the action, in effect, be sisted
pending the outcome ofMr.Brentall's reclaimer.
28 Supra.n.21 per Lord Robertson at 484.
29 First Division, 10th.January, 1952, unreported.
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"Natural justice has a number of facets, but it certainly includes the
principle that a decision should not be taken against a party without
that party having a fair opportunity to know what the case against
him is and a fair opportunity to deal with the case.,,30
- in short, audi alteram partem. The Lord Justice Clerk rejected the argument
that a hearing before Synod would, in the circumstances be a useless formality,
and quoted with approval Lord President Clyde in Barrs v. British Wool
Marketing Board:
"It is not a question of whether the Tribunal has arrived at a fair
result - for in most cases that would involve an examination into the
merits of the case upon which the Tribunal is final. The question is
whether the Tribunal has dealt fairly and equally with the parties
before it in arriving at the result. The test is not, has an unjust result
been reached? but, was there an opportunity afforded for injustice to
be done? If so, the decision cannot stand. ,,31
The court therefore decided that the defenders had proceeded in breach of the
rules of natural justice and, on that basis, found for the pursuer.
BUCHAN V. BRODIE32
The question of the Court of Session's power of judicial review in the case of
an alleged breach of natural justice by the Established Church itself had
previously been raised in Buchan v. Brodie. No opinion had been issued in that
case, and what follows are the facts as rehearsed by Lord Osborne in Logan v.
Presbytery of Dumbarton.33
The petitioner, Buchan, had been an appellant to the Judicial Commission of
the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in relation to a matter of
discipline. The Commission deliberated on the appeal but was inquorate when it
30 Supra. n.2] at 482.
31 ]957 S.L.T.153 at ]57.
32 Outer House, 15th.August, ]984, unreported.
33 ]995 S.L.T.1228 at ]232; also noted in Davidson, 57Jpra.n.4 at para.1505 n.2.
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did so. On the advice of the Procurator, the General Assembly declared the
earlier proceedings null and void and remitted the case to the Judicial
Commission for rehearing. The petitioner then applied to the Court of Session for
interim interdict, pending full hearing, to prevent the Commission from
proceeding, on the grounds that members of the Commission who had sat on the
earlier appeal had already made up their minds and that it was contrary to natural
justice that they should rehear the appeal. The answer to the petition contained a
plea of no jurisdiction, citing Article IV of the Articles Declaratory to the Church
of Scotland Act 1921. Interim interdict was refused.
LOGAN v.PRESBYTERY OF DUMBARTON4
The current position under the common law as regards judicial review of the
actings of the COlu1sof the Established Church appears to be that stated in Logan
v. Presbytery of Dumbarton. Mr.Logan was Parish Minister at Abbotsford,
Clydebank. He had been running a business from his manse, and when he applied
retrospectively to the Presbytery for permission to do so, it was refused. He gave
assurances that he would abide by the decision of Presbytery; but, it was libelled
in tile subsequent hearing before Presbytery, he had then failed to abide by those
assurances and was therefore in contempt. He was then suspended from the
exercise of his office and an interim Moderator appointed to the charge. After the
granting of an interim interdict suspending the decision of the Presbytery, the
case came before the Outer House once more on a motion for the recall of the
interim orders.
Counsel for the defenders argued that the matter was one which fell squarely
within the jurisdiction of the courts of tile Church, on the grounds that it
constituted a issue of doctrine, worship, government and discipline in the Church
within the terms of Article IV of the Articles Declaratory, and that the proper
course for the petitioner was to exercise his right of appeal to the General
Assembly against the decision of Presbytery.
The Lord Ordinary [Osborne] concluded that he had no jurisdiction in the
matter; and his judgment is worth quoting at some length:
"As I understand the argument for the petitioner, it proceeded upon
the basis that, since the powers of tile Church had been the subject
of parliamentary enactment, it followed that the decisions of the
34 Ibid.
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Church, albeit in relation to spiritual matters, fell within the scope of
the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court of Session. It appears to me
that such a proposition involves a non sequitur. In the first place, it
overlooks the fact that, to quote the words of Lord Justice Clerk
Aitchson in Ballantyne v. Presbytery ofWigtown35 .. , the Act of
1921 'is not an Act of Parliament conferring rights upon the Church,
but it is a recognition by Parliament of Articles framed by the
General Assembly of the Church as its Supreme Court in the
exercise of what it claimed to be its own inherent powers. '
Furthermore, '[t]he Act came into operation by an Order of His
Majesty in Council on 28th.June, 1926, and then only after the
Declaratory Articles had been adopted by an Act of the General
Assembly of the Church of Scotland with the consent of a majority
of the Presbyteries of the Church. This adoption of the Articles by
the free will of the Church after the Act was on the statute book,
and as a condition of the Act becoming operative, was a assertion
by the Church of its autonomy in matters affecting its own life and
polity.' In the light of these observations, it seems to me that the
situation of the courts of the Church of Scotland cannot be
equiparated with any tribunal created or upon which a power has
been conferred by Parliament... "36
The leading case on the subject of judicial review is West v. Secretary o.fState
for Scotland; in it the Inner House set out the current law in considerable detail.
Delivering judgment on behalf of the whole court, Lord President Hope stated
that:
"the Court of Session has power, in the exercise of its supervisory
jurisdiction, to regulate the process by which decisions are taken by
any person or body to whom a jurisdiction, power or authority has
been delegated or entrusted by statute, agreement or any other
instrument. "37
3S 1936 S.L.T. at 654.
36 Supra.n.33 at 1235
37 1992 S.L.T.636 at 650 [emphasis added].
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Crucially, however, Lord Osborne distinguished between this elucidation of the
supervisory jurisdiction of the Court of Session and the competence of the courts
of the Kirk, and concluded that:
" ..it is quite plain that the courts of the Church of Scotland do not
fall within this [definition] since ... it cannot be said that those courts
are bodies 'to whom a jurisdiction, power or authority has been
delegated or entrusted by statute.' It appears to me that what was
achieved in the Act of 1921 was a recognition by Parliament of
certain pre-existing inherent powers in the Church of Scotland,
rather than the conferring of powers upon it."38
Lord Osborne noted with approval the obiter of Lord Murray in Ballantyne v.
Presbytery of Wigtown/9 that the Court of Session had exclusive jurisdiction to
detennine the meaning and effect of the 1921 Act and the Declaratory Articles.
Following Lord Murray's conclusion, he asserted that the remedy of judicial
review might be available in certain circumstances; he did not, however, give any
indication as to what those circumstances might be.40 He concluded with the
passages from Lord President Boyle in Lockhart and Lord Justice Clerk
Moncrieff already quoted.41
THE FUTURE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Writing in 1992 Lord Mackay of Clashfem, at the time Lord Chancellor,
argued that:
"The authority of the Church in matters spiritual is thoroughly
recognised, not only by Parliament but also by the courts. This
attitude so far as the courts are concerned extends to other
churches than the Church o{Scotland itsell The courts do not take. .
upon themselves the responsibility of deciding matters offaith. They
38 Supra.n.33 at 1235
39 Supra.n.35 at 664.
40 5'upra.n.33 at 1236.
41 Supra.n.6 & n.8.
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may have to decide as a matter of fact what were the beliefs of a
particular organization at a particular time as those beliefs may
defme the constitution of the organization for whose benefit monies
are held in trust. "42
Construed in the narrowest sense possible, this is undoubtedly the case; but it
sheds little light on the likely attitude of the courts to a whole range of possible
solutions. The crux of the problem is to define "matters spiritual". It is tolerably
clear that the substitution by canon law of one communion rite for another, as in
Forhes v. Eden, is a spiritual matter rather than a temporal one; it can reasonably
be argued that such an action is hardly different in kind from the voluntary
association that is the Scottish Rugby Football Union changing the penalty for
intentionally collapsing the scrum should it choose so to do.43 Equally, there are
clear cases in which a patrimonial interest is involved.
Whether the decision of the Synod of the Free Presbyterian Church complained
of in Brentall related to a spiritual or to a temporal matter, however, is not at all
apparent. Given the importance of the theology of Protest for the history of that
Church, did the argument over Protest mean that the matter was a spiritual one?
Or was it merely an action for reparation on the grounds of wrongfl.1ldismissal?
Conversely, the pursuer's conduct in Logan seems to have had little, if anything,
to do with "matters spiritua1." Mr.Logan's offence was to run a business from his
manse without the agreement of his Presbytery and no doubt, from his
perspective, there were patrimonial interests involved, both as a Parish Minister
and as the proprietor of the business to which his Presbytery had taken exception.
But this was never put to the test, since the Court of Session refused to review
the decision of a court of the Established Church on what that court had ruled
was a disciplinary case under Article IV of the Articles Declaratory.
It would appear, rather, from the foregoing discussion that, at the time of
writing, the position of the Kirk vis-a-vis the Court of Session is markedly
dtfferent from that of the other religious bodies in Scotland. Unlike the situation
in England, where the decisions of the judicatories of voluntary associations are
42 Mackay of Clashfem, Lord, "The Law, the Word, and the Head of the Kirk" in Lamont
S. (Ed): St Andrews Rock: Bellew - London 1992 at 149 [emphasis added).
43 Though the International Board might have views on the matter!
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not subject to judicial review because they lack any element of public law,44in
Scotland such voluntary associations are in principle subject to judicial review of
their actings - however reluctant the Court of Session may be to involve itself in
any particular set of circumstances. For example in Brentall, Lord Dunpark noted
(without comment, because the point was not at issue) that the Manual of
Practice qfthe Free Presbyterian Church conferred the nobile qfficium upon the
Free Presbyterian Church Synod.45It is no doubt open to any voluntary
association in Scotland, religious or otherwise, to confer upon its supreme
governing body, ifit so wishes, the exercise ofa power which it may choose to
call the nobile C?[ficium- if by that term it means, in effect, "the application of the
rules moderated by common-sense." Such a power must, however, be exercised
in accordance with the rules of natural justice and must inevitably be subject to
judicial review. The nobile officium of the General Assembly of the Kirk, on the
other hand, is an entirely different matter. It is identical with that exercised by the
Court of Session in civil causes, inhering in the fact that the Assembly is the
Supreme Court of the Established Church in ecclesiastical causes; and it is
exercised independently.
Commenting on the law as it stood in 1980 and following the dicta of Lord
Justice Clerk Moncrieff in Wight,46 Professor Francis Lyall concluded that:
"So long as the courts of the Church do not act plainly ultra vires,
or maliciously, or manifestly unjustly (not merely unjustly) or
contrary to some civil enactment, no action will lie to reduce their
proceedings, or to obtain redress for any injury they have caused.
But this is not the same as a statement that the courts of the Church
have absolute independence from review by the civil COurtS.,,47
It is clear that the legislative and judicial actings of dissenting ecclesiastical
bodies are of the nature of the mles of voluntary associations: binding on the
members but on no-one else, and even then, binding only if they have been
arrived at by due process. Commenting on what can only be described as a
44 R. v. Chief Rahbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of Great Britain and the
Commonwealth, expo Wachmann[1993] I W.L.R.I036.
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bizarre judgment by the Episcopal Synod of the Scottish Episcopal Church in
1984 on an appeal by the Vestry of St.Devenick' s Church, Beildside, concerning
access to that congregation's Register of Baptised Members and Adherents,
George W.Patterson asks:
"will the civil courts asswne jurisdiction if an ecclesiastical court
claims that the law of Scotland has been modified by the
association's internal rules, even though according to normal
principles of interpretation no such modification is apparent?,>48
After Brentall, one might reasonable conclude that, providing the court in
question was a tribunal of a dissenting Church, the answer to Patterson's
question would be in the affirmative.
As to the Church of Scotland, the present writer would suggest that the law on
judicial review has been developing since 1980 in sllch a way as to lead to the
conclusion that, for all practical purposes, the General Assembly and the Judicial
Commission of the Kirk are currently immune from judicial review of their
actings - as, in all probability, are presbyteries and kirk sessions. Up to now, it
has been difficult, in the light of Lord Osborne's judgment in Logan, to envisage
any circumstances in which the caveat emmciated by Lord Murray in Ballantyne
about the power of the Court of Session to interpret the 1921 Act could in fact
apply, even though Lord Osborne quoted it with approval. In what circumstances
could the Court of Session now intervene? Malice? - but how can one allege
malice against a court of the realm? Want of jurisdiction? - but the cases that are
heard in the courts of the Kirk are by definition ecclesiastical causes. Procedural
irregularity?
But if the Court of Session will not go behind the definition in Article IV, then
it will presumably not entertain any arguments about procedural impropriety or
disregard of the rules of natural justice. 49 What may change the situation,
however, is the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 which incorporates into
United Kingdom law Articles 2 to 12 and 14 of the European Convention on
48 Supra.n.20 at 161. The appeal was heard on 20th. December, 1984; because the
Episcopal Synod is not a court of the realm it is, of course, unreported.
49 There remains the possibility of an action for a breach of statutory duty; but, given the
nature of their respective responsibilities, this would more likely to be brought against the General
Trustees, under the terms of the Church of Scotland (properties and Investments) Act 1925,
rather than against the Assembly itself
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Human Rights and Articles 1 to 3 of the First Protocol thereto, as read with
Articles 16 to 18 of the Convention. so
In his speech on the third reading of the Bill in the House of Lords, the Lord
Advocate, Lord Hardie, addressed the question of whether or not the courts of
the Kirk were courts for the purposes of Clause 6 of the Bill.5!Section 6(1) of the
Act states that "[i]t is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is
incompatible with a Convention right" and Section 6(3) defines a court or
tribunal as a "public authority" for the purposes of 6(1).
Lord Hardie began from the position that the courts of the Kirk:
"do not, as a matter either of their constitution or practice, carry out
any judicial functions on behalf of the State. Nor do they adjudicate
upon a citizen's legal rights or obligations, whether common law or
statutory. They operate in relation to matters which are essentially
of a private nature. ,,52
The effect of the 1921 Act was therefore:
"to define the Church [of Scotland] as a non-public or private
institution in the sense that its affairs were no concern to the State.
The 1921 Act effectively disestablished the Church of Scotland. It
would seem to me illogical to say that the State had no interest or
jurisdiction over the affairs of the Church and its courts while at the
same time saying that those courts were nevertheless courts for the
purposes of a public general Act.,,53
He went on to say, however, that the courts of the Kirk might in some
circumstances be regarded as "public authorities" for the purposes of the
legislation. In particular, he gave the example of proceedings by a kirk session
considering disciplinary action against a minister and the requirement under
Article 6 of the Convention that there should be "a fair and public hearing ..by an
50 The texts are set out in extenso in Schedule 1 to the Act.
51 HL.Deb.(l997-1998) 5 Februal)' 1998 col.792. In an amended form, it became section
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independent and impartial tribunal established by law." He went on to suggest
that:
"questions might then arise - I emphasise that I am referring to a
hypothetical situation - as to whether a kirk session was
independent and impartial and, in particular, whether it was
established by law. I would have some doubts as to whether a kirk
session could be so described ...[It] seems to be reasonably clear that
there was a period in the history of the Church when much of its
administration and government was regulated by Acts of the
Scottish Parliament. At that period it would be easy to say that kirk
sessions, and indeed the Assembly itself, were "established by law."
However that may have been, it appears to me that the effect of the
192] Act was to cut the connection between the general law of the
land and the administration and government of the Church. That
being so, it must be at least doubtful whether the kirk session and
the General Assembly could any longer be said to be "established
by law." It is also possible that questions might be raised as to
whether Church courts present a sufficient appearance of
independence and impartiality. ,,54
He concluded that:
"If a Church body to which the Bill applies commits a wrong in
convention tenns, it would fall to the civil courts to right it. The
convention rights are in this context part of the law of the land. The
civil courts would investigate the convention issue ... in exactly the
same way as which they would address any otller question arising
under the law of the land; for example, a complaint that someone
acting on behalf of the Church had committed a delict... The civil
courts' task does not, and cannot, involve trespassing on the
doctrinal and spiritual interests of the Church ...,,55
S4 Ibid. at col. 796.
SS Ibid.
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CONCLUSION
Section 13(1) of the Act provides that in determinating of any question arising
under the legislation which might "affect the exercise by a religious
organisation ... of the Convention right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion" the court must "have particular regard to the importance of that right.".
It is difficult to see, however, how this might be applied in practice in a purely
disciplinary case
The hypothetical example offered by the Lord Advocate, of a claim by a
minister that judicial proceedings against him were irregular and therefore
contrary to Article 6 of the Convention, was very similar to the argument
advanced by the petitioner in Buchan v. Brodie.56 On that occasion, as we have
seen, the Court of Session refused to go behind the tenns of Article IV of the
Schedule to the 1921 Act; but would it do so now? Similarly, once one sets
aside the power of a presbytery to determine whether or not a case before it is
one of discipline under Article IV, then the facts in Brenta1l57 and the facts in
Logan58 begin to have a good deal in common. It is clear, therefore, that what
was settled law has now become unsettled.
Article IV asserts:
"the right and power subject to no civil authority to legislate, and to
adjudicate finally, in all matters of doctrine, worship, government
and discipline in the Church ..."
In any future action of the kind contemplated by the Lord Advocate, the matter
at issue will in all probability be whether or not the judgment of the court which
is called into question relates to " functions of a public nature" under section
6(3)(b) of the Act, and whether a case of discipline under Article IV should be so
defined - given that Article IV distinguishes between doctrine, worship,
government and discipline. The effects of the Act on the exclusive jurisdiction of
the courts of the Kirk and on the development of the law in this area therefore
remain to be seen.
56 Supra.n.32.
57 Supra. n.21.
58 Supra.n.33.
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